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5.1 Introduction
Samuel Taylor Coleridge wrote about an ancient mariner stranded at sea,
but he might as well have been writing about nineteenth-century American
cities.1 Although large-scale municipal water supplies ﬁrst emerged in the
United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century, water resource de-
velopment and provision in many American cities remained abysmal many
decades later. A large share of households continued to rely on private wells
and privies, which generally resulted in “circular water systems” that recir-
culated household waste and perpetuated disease (Melosi 2000). Some
larger cities and wealthier neighborhoods had initially enjoyed an escape
from this vicious cycle. However, rapid urban growth, a weak understand-
ing of disease transmission, and rudimentary sanitary engineering resulted
in the deterioration of water provision and sewage removal to the point that
they became large-scale circular water systems (Duﬀy 1990). Massive ﬁres
still wreaked havoc as early water systems failed to meet the needs of un-
precedented urban growth (Anderson 1988).
5
Water, Water Everywhere
Municipal Finance and Water
Supply in American Cities
David Cutler and Grant Miller
David Cutler is dean of social sciences and a professor of economics at Harvard University
and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Grant Miller is as-
sistant professor at the Stanford Medical School and a faculty research fellow at the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
We thank conference participants for helpful comments and suggestions. Michael Edel-
stein, Claudia Goldin, and Sukkoo Kim graciously made historical data available to us.
Research support from the National Institute on Aging grant number T32 AG00186 through
the National Bureau of Economic Research is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are 
our own.
1. The title of our paper comes from the famous verse of Coleridge: “Water, water, every
where / And all the boards did shrink; / Water, water, every where, / Nor any drop to drink”
(The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, 1797).Although Coleridge would have been out of place by the 1930s, many
historical observers attribute the absence of piped water during the pre-
ceding decades to poor local governance and corruption in the public sec-
tor. As one put it, “It was the neglect and indiﬀerence of the city politicians
and businessmen that permitted the unhealthy conditions to continue long
after it was painfully evident that it aﬀected all of the inhabitants of the
city....  I n  f e a r  o f  l o s ing patronage, the politicians refused to cede some of
their power to separate and independent public works and health agen-
cies” (Alewitz 1989). Time variation in local government corruption and
water system construction also suggests a negative correlation between the
two. However, major investments in water systems coincided with a rapid
rise in public ownership between 1890 and the 1920s. If bad local gover-
nance or corruption was responsible for the conspicuous absence of piped
water for so long, why did public-sector involvement suddenly lead to so
much apparent progress? An obvious answer might be that supplying wa-
ter was just another means of corruption. Theft from the public (the way
that corruption is deﬁned in this volume) was commonly achieved by over-
paying for inputs or contract work in exchange for kickbacks (Blake 1956;
Steﬀens 1957).2
We contend that historical evidence fails to support corruption-based
explanations for waterworks construction and public-sector involvement.
First, we present case histories of municipal water systems that suggest that
cities tapped new water supplies or greatly improved existing ones when
private suppliers failed to perform well. We then discuss two major types
of explanations for municipally led improvements in water systems.3 One
ischanges in the value (or perceived value) of water systems. The late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries were times of major advances in the
understanding of disease. It is possible that the public goods nature of
clean water became clear during this era. But this explanation does not
seem right; the link between dirty water and disease was apparent long be-
fore the acceptance of germ theory, even if the biological mechanism
underlying the link was not well understood. Alternatively, increases in the
population density of cities may have increased the need for clean water as
public health conditions deteriorated. However, there do not appear to
have been sharp changes in population density that coincided with water-
works expansion and public ownership.
The second type of explanation is that the costs of water systems were
changing. Water systems are a natural monopoly, so private ﬁrms that win
contracts for them have incentives to underprovide services (and charge a
high price). As cities grew, welfare losses may have also grown. We suspect
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2. Also see the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ chapter in this volume.
3. This paper focuses on radical increases in the quantityof water supplied in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Cutler and Miller (2005) examine water quality and
health.this cannot be the whole explanation, however. Other utilities like the gas
industry were predominantly private even though they were also natural
monopolies. Contracting between the public and private sector in the era
prior to municipal ownership may also have been diﬃcult. Contracting
costs between cities and private water companies were presumably rising,
but the timing and pattern of public ownership across big and small cities
suggests this is not the primary explanation. Private companies may have
also feared expropriation by municipal authorities after making costly in-
frastructure investments (Troesken and Geddes 2003). However, private
water companies were actually more likely to have expensive ﬁltration
plants than public ones (Troesken 1999), and no similar pattern of public
ownership emerged in other utilities that required large investments. Other
explanations such as reductions in corruption costs due to administrative
reforms and the rise of a cadre of skilled municipal engineers also appear
unsatisfactory.
We propose an alternative explanation for the rapid growth of water sys-
tems and public ownership that emphasizes the costs of capital and the de-
velopment of local public ﬁnance. In the late nineteenth century, there was
enormous latent demand for the expansion of waterworks—to serve ne-
glected neighborhoods, to ﬁnd clean water for drinking, and to ensure suf-
fcient water supplies for ﬁghting ﬁres. The cost of building suﬃciently large
water systems was also enormous. Modern water systems frequently re-
quired transporting water from far away and investing in ﬁltration plants.
These costs were too large for private ﬁrms and suﬃciently large that only
the largest cities or cities with access to sophisticated municipal ﬁnance
techniques could aﬀord them.4 While the largest cities invested in water
systems prior to the late nineteenth century, we propose that the develop-
ment of municipal bond markets was key to providing an adequate volume
of water in many American cities. We present some evidence for this ex-
planation using data on the cost of municipal water systems, the develop-
ment of means of ﬁnancing them, the time pattern of investment in water
resources, and a time series of historical municipal bond yields.
In this essay, our approach is informal; we provide some selected trends,
illustrations, and case studies to support our contention that the develop-
ment of local public ﬁnance was primarily responsible for water system im-
provements. The second section presents a snapshot of how American
cities typically addressed their water and sanitation needs before the adop-
tion of modern water and sewage systems. The third section presents case
histories of Boston and New York, suggesting that city governments inter-
vened to provide water when existing private ones failed to perform well.
The fourth section examines the development of local public ﬁnance and
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4. Early in the nineteenth century before the development of municipal ﬁnance, private
companies were perhaps better suited to building water systems.its importance in the construction and expansion of water systems. The
ﬁfth and sixth sections review alternative explanations for local govern-
ment ownership and control of water supplies and provide evidence refut-
ing each; the seventh section concludes.
5.2 A Snapshot of Municipal Water and Sewer Systems in 
the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
The following subsections discuss various aspects of municipal water
and sewer systems around the turn of the twentieth century.
5.2.1 Household Wells and Privies
Households not connected to municipal water and sewer systems gener-
ally provided these services for themselves by digging wells and privies on
their lots. Dry privies were generally used only for human waste and were
generally placed a distance from homes. Cesspools received human and
other types of wet waste and were generally placed in basements or imme-
diately adjacent to homes, into which household drainage was emptied.
(The terms privyand cesspoolhave come to be used interchangeably.) Priv-
ies and cesspools were generally constructed by digging a hole about three
or four feet in diameter and at least ﬁve feet deep. Cesspool overﬂow was
very common, saturating the surrounding earth with ﬁlth. Privy vaults
were generally lined with brick, stone, or wood. Over a period of time,
vaults would rot or begin to disintegrate; even in their prime, they were
porous enough to allow contaminants to escape. The common result was
the tainting of nearby groundwater into which household wells generally
drew (Duﬀy 1990; Melosi 2000).
Not all waste material made its way directly into household water sup-
plies or the surrounding soil. In many other cases, it journeyed to the
streets in front of private lots. Liquid wastes were allowed to run into the
open gutters of the alleys and into the streets. Here they mixed with cess-
pool contents removed from privies by hand and bucket and with dead ani-
mals and refuse (Duﬀy 1990). City governments would sporadically send
horse-drawn carts through residential areas to remove the buildup of
waste that collected in the streets and gutters. Removed waste known as
“night soil” was used as a fertilizer through the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, when an overwhelming preponderance of scientiﬁc evidence had
demonstrated such practices to be unhealthy. Cities gradually began to in-
troduce a new suction method of emptying privies using airtight hoses and
cart removal, although these services were not often provided on a suﬃ-
ciently regular basis. The prevalence of cobblestone streets also exacer-
bated the problems of festering garbage and waste dumped onto streets.
Cobblestone surfaces did not wash or drain well, and they made waste re-
moval considerably more diﬃcult and less eﬀective (Duﬀy 1990).
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The challenges of constructing large municipal water systems were quite
formidable during the nineteenth century (indeed, they are not trivial to-
day). A variety of complex decisions had to be made; each one involved ex-
tensive research and planning together with a precarious balancing act in
volatile political environments. An appropriate water source had to be
identiﬁed. For most cities, there were generally many candidates, includ-
ing surface water (streams, rivers, and lakes) and groundwater sources of
various sorts. Survey work by geologists and engineers was a diﬃcult and
time-consuming task, and their ﬁndings were often controversial and sub-
ject to political pressure. Each potential source required estimates of
supply volume and purity (particularly diﬃcult before science elucidated
what “purity” meant). Engineers would then attempt to estimate how wa-
ter from each source could be delivered to city populations. This involved
acquiring water using pumps and dams, transporting it via large aque-
ducts, raising it to suﬃcient elevation to facilitate ﬂow by means of gravity,
and storing suﬃcient quantities of water in large city reservoirs to smooth
water consumption across periods of high and low demand (Blake 1956).
With this information, each potential water source would then require
rough cost estimates. Not surprisingly, these estimates were often quite in-
accurate. Private interests also commonly exerted considerable inﬂuence
over these estimates and surveys. In most cases, the expense of such water-
works projects were staggering regardless of the source chosen, totaling
many times annual municipal revenue in some cases (Blake 1956). Given
the amount of information required, the uncertainty surrounding it, the
sheer size of the ﬁnancial commitment, uncertainty about future city
needs, and strong political pressures from various directions, it is not sur-
prising that many decades of debate often preceded signiﬁcant waterworks
projects.
5.2.3 Sanitary Problems Linked to Municipal Water and Sewer Systems
During the 1870s and 1880s, major cities expanded or built new water
and sewer systems, instituted systematic garbage collection, and began
paving cobblestone roads with smoother materials like granite and occa-
sionally asphalt. Clearly these services—municipal water and sewers in
particular—held promise for addressing the woes caused by household
wells and privies. But their promise was not to be immediately realized.
Sanitary engineering was developing as a ﬁeld during the 1870s and
1880s, which meant that many of the eastern cities with sewers and drains
constructed in earlier years were done so in a haphazard and inadequate
manner (Melosi 2000). A considerable amount of waste continued to be
dumped into city streets, and these wastes were generally swept or washed
down drains and into sewers. Water systems generally provided inadequate
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regular basis. Moreover, because most sewer systems were only designed to
carry storm water, they often became clogged because they lacked suﬃ-
cient capacity (many were not more than 2.5 or 3 feet in diameter; Duﬀy
1990). Rapid population growth during the nineteenth century greatly ex-
acerbated the capacity problems of existing systems and often negated the
beneﬁts of investments made to improve existing systems. In addition to a
large amount of waste introduced into sewers from city streets, the advent
of water closets in the United States in the 1870s added considerable strain
to already overburdened sewers. The end result was often backﬂow from
sewers into streets and gutters; some observers began referring to sewers as
“elongated cesspools” (Duﬀy 1990).
Perhaps the worst sort of backﬂow was the emptying of sewer systems
directly into drinking water supplies. In the late nineteenth century, the pri-
mary sewer outfalls of many American cities emptied upstream of river
water intakes or directly into large water bodies (like the Great Lakes) in
close proximity to water intakes. The few cities that addressed this problem
early on also suﬀered from the dumping of untreated sewage by upstream
communities. This phenomenon essentially reproduced the household cir-
cular water systems on the municipal level (Duﬀy 1990).
5.2.4 Service Provision at the Household Level
Household water and sewer connections were often poorly constructed,
resulting in waste and the continued spreading of ﬁlth. Annual ﬂat fees
were paid for piped water, giving households no incentive to ﬁx leaky con-
nections. Not until early in the twentieth century did many cities make
eﬀorts to meter household water, charging rates per volume of water used
(or wasted) rather than ﬂat fees. Water pressure, turgidity, and taste varied
greatly from moment to moment, and isolated reports of other irregulari-
ties emerged from time to time (for example, ﬁsh being delivered through
infrastructure pipes into bathtubs). As water closets began replacing
simple privies and chamber pots after 1870, many of them resulted in more
unsanitary conditions than the use of privies and cesspools. Many were not
properly installed (permits to install water closets were trivial to obtain)
and resulted in considerable sewage leakage (Melosi 2000).
5.2.5 Water Systems and Fires
The importance of water systems to combat major ﬁres was an issue that
emerged early in the nineteenth century. The growth of population and
structures meant growth in the consequences of uncontrolled ﬁres. Bucket
brigades and water wagons were clearly inadequate to manage large con-
ﬂagrations. In areas of cities served by water supplies, water for extin-
guishing ﬁres was tapped in several ways. The most rudimentary method
was to drill holes in wooden water pipes; these holes could be corked or
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ﬁre hydrants. Arrangements for use of water ranged from cities paying hy-
drant rental fees to private water companies to water being made freely
available for purposes of putting out ﬁres. However, water pressure was in-
adequate to eﬀectively combat ﬁres with some regularity. Even in cities
with well-developed water systems, they often did not extend to outlying
areas, poor neighborhoods, and regions of high elevation. These areas
were clearly particularly vulnerable to the destruction of ﬁres, and ﬁre in-
surance was more costly by several orders of magnitude (Anderson 1988).
5.2.6 Public Takeovers of Private Water Systems
Cities wishing to increase their involvement in the delivery of water es-
sentially had two choices: build a water system if one did not exist or take
control of existing private water systems. Municipal takeovers of existing
private water systems generally involved either the outright purchase of
private companies or the introduction of a municipal competitor to a pri-
vate water company (essentially bankrupting the private company). The spe-
ciﬁcs of how this was done depended on the private company’s charter. For
example, if a private company had exclusive legal rights to provide water to
residents of a city, these rights would generally have to be purchased. If a
private company had exclusive legal rights to a given water source, a mu-
nicipal water company could either buy this right or ﬁnd another source.
City governments could also petition state legislatures to revoke private
water company charters under extreme circumstances.
Once a water company was municipally owned, it had to be operated.
This usually required the establishment of a standing municipal water
board that wasn’t subject to changes with every electoral cycle (although
appointment to boards was of course political), as opposed to being oper-
ated directly by a city council. Water boards would manage systems in con-
junction with hired engineers and contractors. Rates would be set and col-
lected from citizens and ﬁrms. Improvements or expansions would often
begin with surveys and draft proposals prepared by engineers retained by
the board. The board would decide which ones it preferred to pursue and
would seek political permission and ﬁnancing from the city council or
other relevant municipal government authority. Once political permission
was obtained and ﬁnancing was approved, the water board would solicit
bids for municipal contracts to actually conduct the work.
5.2.7 The Changing Landscape of Water Provision in Subsequent Years
The construction of water systems progressed rapidly at the end of the
nineteenth century, and adequately engineered sewer systems gradually re-
placed the older ones designed for storm water early in the twentieth cen-
tury. Near the end of the period that we examine, the 1932 federal Relief
and Reconstruction Act authorized $1.5 billion to be lent to state and lo-
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sources was spent on improving water and sewer systems (Melosi 2000).
Not only did nearly all cities build and greatly improve water and sewer
systems by this point in time, but access to them across diverse neighbor-
hoods within cities was also greatly expanded.
The consequences of vastly improved water systems are very diﬃcult to
estimate empirically for a variety of reasons, but they undoubtedly include
superior protection against ﬁres, vast health gains, and other stimuli of
economic development. The availability of water to combat ﬁres was no
longer perceived as a problem at all. Great strides in health improvement
also coincided with (and appear to be driven by) water quality improve-
ments (Cutler and Miller 2005). In the short span of ﬁve or six decades, the
sanitary environment of many American cities was transformed from one
of ﬁlth to one that resembles a modern city.
5.3 Case Histories of Boston and New York
The evolution of waterworks construction and ownership was diﬀerent
in every city. Keeping this in mind, we present case histories of Boston and
New York below.5 In both cases, waterworks were clearly used to further
private interests in a variety of ways, both legitimate and otherwise. Boston
and New York were reluctant to make the initial investments necessary to
build water systems and preferred that private investors instead lead the
way. The water supplies of both cities began with small-scale private ven-
tures that proved to be inadequate to meet the needs of growing cities. In
the end, the governments of both cities intervened to purse grander proj-
ects than private companies were willing to embrace in order to increase
the available supply of water. Both examples illustrate the enormous scale
of water projects.
5.3.1 Boston
In 1794 a group of entrepreneurs submitted a petition to the Massachu-
setts legislature to be incorporated to deliver water from Jamaica Pond to
residents of Boston. The City of Roxbury, in which Jamaica Pond is lo-
cated, opposed this proposal to no end. The following year the state legis-
lature approved the application and incorporated the Aqueduct Corpora-
tion; the City of Boston passed a resolution approving the project as well.
The company’s charter gave it the right to obtain water from anywhere in
Roxbury and deliver it to any part of Boston. It also contained two impor-
tant restrictions: both Roxbury and Boston reserved the right to draw wa-
ter free of charge to combat ﬁres, and water rates were subject to court reg-
ulation.
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5. Both case histories are drawn from Blake (1956).The Aqueduct Corporation project proceeded quickly; it had obtained
pine logs and awarded a contract for laying wooden pipes within months.
Although historical accounts are unclear, customers appear to have been
served with water by the middle of 1798. But the project failed to produce
returns for its investors for twelve years. When its ﬁrst dividends were paid,
rates of return were only about 1.5 percent. Business gradually improved,
however, and over the next thirty years, stock in the company yielded about
a 4 percent annual return.
Although successful, this ﬁrst water system only served about 800 fami-
lies, and its pipes were small and were too shallow, causing them to freeze
during the winter. Movement toward supplying most of the city with water
had its origins in a ﬁre in 1825 that destroyed ﬁfty-three houses and stores
and caused half a million dollars in damage. The city council responded by
beginning serious debate on how an adequate water supply for the city
might be obtained. The debate would continue for nearly twenty-ﬁve more
years.
Boston’s mayor at the time, Mayor Quincy, Sr., assembled a committee
to investigate the matter. An engineer conducting surveys for the city re-
ported that two sources would be most suitable: the Charles River above
the falls at Watertown and Spot Pond in Stoneham. Spot Pond would not
require the complications of pumping or reservoir storage because of its el-
evation. On the issue of ownership, the committee was split. Mayor Quincy
also sought advice from the chairman of the Philadelphia Watering Com-
mittee (the success and scale of the Philadelphia waterworks was of course
renowned); the chairman’s answer both questioned the adequacy of the
Spot Pond supply during dry months and strongly encouraged municipal
ownership of any water system that Boston might pursue. On this advice,
the mayor began denying petitions from entrepreneurs to establish private
water companies. His own eﬀorts were frustrated as well, however, and his
tenure ended without further progress.
Several years later a new mayor named Theodore Lyman again brought
the water issue to the forefront—and went on record favoring municipal
ownership. Jamaica Pond was clearly too small a source to serve the entire
city, so new surveys were begun. These new surveys were completed in 1834
and recommended larger, more distant sources over Spot Pond and the
Charles River primarily because of concerns about volume. Farm and
Shakum Ponds in Framingham as well as Long Pond were touted as the
most suitable alternative water sources.
Mayor Armstrong, elected in 1835, frowned upon seeking water as far
away as Framingham, so he assembled yet another committee to study the
matter. He also charged the committee to make a recommendation for ei-
ther public or private waterworks ownership. Their report favored building
a more modest system than did earlier ones, making allowances for expan-
sion as the city’s population grew rather than investing in a larger system
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came inadequate, the City of Boston could also draw water from Mystic
Pond. Interestingly, attached to the report was the charter of the Boston
Hydraulic Company, which had recently been incorporated by the Massa-
chusetts legislature but was still subject to approval by the city council. Its
charter gave it the authority to take water from any source north of the
Charles River within twelve miles of Boston. It also gave the city the op-
tion of purchasing a considerable share of the new company’s stock. The
city council approved the charter but declined to buy any of its shares.
More mayors were elected, and more committees were appointed to
study how to supply the city with water. In 1837, three city commissioners
were appointed to develop a concrete water supply plan for the city. It con-
sidered four of the usual suspects: Spot Pond, Mystic Pond, Long Pond,
and the Charles River. The Charles River was the most unattractive of the
options because it would require more mechanical pumping—and was
thought to be dirtier—than the others. The real choice was essentially be-
tween Long Pond and Spot Pond (which could be supplemented with wa-
ter from Mystic Pond if necessary). The three commissioners could not
agree among themselves; two of them recommended Spot Pond, and the
mayor attempted to act on it.
In 1838, what was now the standing committee on water and the city
board of aldermen approved a plan to draw water from Spot Pond under
municipal ownership. Not surprisingly, the two private water companies
strenuously objected and even pleaded that competition between them
would best serve the city’s interests. Small townships around Boston also
vehemently protested, fearing that local interests would be hurt and that
land for the project would be seized by condemnation. Investors in the
Middlesex Canal (chartered in 1793 to build a waterway connecting the
Merrimac River with Boston Harbor) also protested that water ﬂow for
their canal project would be diminished. The result of these objections was
a series of protracted hearings.
In 1840 Mayor Jonathan Chapman was elected, and he frowned on the
city’s present water initiative because of the massive outlays required in
light of the rapid growth of the city’s debt in recent years. As the municipal
eﬀort was halted, private eﬀorts were reinvigorated. In 1840, the rights
of the Aqueduct Corporation were expanded to include Brookline and
Brighton. The company also began modest expansions of its works and re-
placed its wooden pipes with more durable iron ones. But it also knew that
it could never supply all sections of Boston from Jamaica Pond. Fearing a
municipally owned water system, it began fostering other private interests
in complementary systems that would supply other areas of the city.
In early 1843, a member of the city council whose family owned Spot
Pond for many years resigned together with colleagues to form a company
to serve Boston from the pond. Several months later the Spot Pond Aque-
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Spot Pond, and it would provide Boston with free water to ﬁght ﬁres. The
City of Boston was entitled to purchase up to one-third of the company’s
stock or to seize the franchise and company property at any time at a price
set by a predetermined formula. Because of an unusual feature of the char-
ter that made stockholders individually liable for company debts, the city
decided not to purchase any shares of the Spot Pond Aqueduct Company.
In 1844 a city initiative to tap water in Long Pond (the only source now
considered by the city administration to possess adequate supply for the
entire city) was revived. Additional costs of supplementing Spot Pond wa-
ter with Mystic Pond water reportedly made Long Pond the most appeal-
ing source in light of Boston’s continued rapid population growth. The two
commissioners who originally constituted a majority in favoring Spot
Pond had now changed their minds; Long Pond was now the unanimous
choice recommended by a new commission report. After considerable
wrangling in the legislature and a few compromise amendments, in 1845
Boston was given approval by the legislature to construct a municipal wa-
ter supply that tapped Long Pond. However, supporters of the private com-
panies campaigned vigorously against it, and it was defeated by popular
vote in the referendum.
The Spot Pond Aqueduct Corporation attempted to ﬁll the vacuum, and
it submitted a proposal to the city council oﬀering to sell the city its water
rights and Spot Pond itself. In considering the company’s oﬀer, the city
once again reconsidered all of its options for water and once again sought
outside help in assessing both the city’s future water needs and the quality
of each potential source. John Jervis, the chief engineer of the Croton
Aqueduct Project, was chosen to conduct the new surveys. While awaiting
the Jervis report, parties favoring each source were attempting to position
themselves as well as possible. Promoters of Spot Pond invited members of
the city council to an extravagant reception and viewing of the pond, but
the viewing had precisely the opposite eﬀect of what was intended because
the pond happened to be at its lowest level for the occasion. (The small
quantity of water available from Spot Pond was of course its primary draw-
back.) The group later claimed that the Long Pond faction had placed large
stones to obstruct the ﬂow of water into the pond at the time of the event.
In the end, the report headed by John Jervis strongly supported the Long
Pond proposal. Shortly afterwards Josiah Quincy, Jr., son of the mayor
who had initially explored the construction of a municipal waterworks,
was elected mayor and promised to pursue water from Long Pond. Under
Mayor Quincy, the City of Boston had to obtain new authority from the
state legislature again to pursue its project. It was virtually unopposed
(save only by the township of Lowell), and in 1846 the legislature passed a
new water act. A groundbreaking ceremony marked the beginning of the
project shortly afterward. In 1848, Boston celebrated the arrival of its new
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of Frog Pond in the Boston Common.
As a small side matter, there was discontent that the city’s future water
source had such a mundane name. A little research uncovered the pond’s
previous Indian name: Cochituate. Miraculously, the word’s etymology
was discovered to mean “an ample supply of pure and soft water, of a suﬃ-
cient elevation to carry into the City of Boston, at a moderate expense”
(Blake 1956). The mayor’s proposal that Long Pond should subsequently
be known as Lake Cochituate was enthusiastically embraced.
The completion of Boston’s municipally owned water system created ob-
vious problems for the private companies that still existed. In late 1848 the
old Aqueduct Corporation asked that the city purchase its water rights and
property, pleading that the city remember that private shareholders had
made great sacriﬁce for the public good. The mayor originally planned to
oﬀer the corporation $100,000, but the city council knew that the old
Aqueduct Corporation had no alternative but to sell its rights and property
to the city. The council was therefore willing to go along with a purchase
for $20,000, a price at which the company took great oﬀense. The city and
the Aqueduct Corporation failed to reach an agreement, and the company
continued serving about 400 people who preferred water from Jamaica
Pond to Cochituate water. In 1851, a new city body administering the wa-
terworks negotiated to purchase the company for $45,000, and the com-
pany accepted the oﬀer. This was eﬀectively the end of private water in
Boston, although some years later the city did sell the rights to supply the
City of Roxbury with water from Jamaica Pond to a new private entity
named the Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corporation.
5.3.2 New York
Had it not been for the impediment of the Revolutionary War, a man
named Christopher Colles might have succeeded in building a water sys-
tem in New York late in the eighteenth century. After the war, numerous
citizen movements pressed the city council to construct waterworks for the
city. In 1798, a proposal by a physician, scientist, and engineer named
Joseph Browne to dam and tap water from the Bronx River was seriously
entertained. However, Joseph Browne also proposed that a private entity
carry the proposed project forward. The city council considered it unde-
sirable to place a private company in such a powerful position, so it instead
decided to request authority from the state legislature to build a water sys-
tem itself. Through clever maneuvering of state Assemblyman Aaron Burr,
however, the bill that the state legislature produced authorized a charter for
a private water company instead. Ironically, it was Alexander Hamilton
whose advocacy then persuaded the city council to accept the bill as pro-
duced by the state legislature. One of the main points that furthered its case
was the avoidance of enormous expense and taxpayer burden.
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ter placed far fewer requirements on it than did other contemporary
private water company charters of the day (again, courtesy of the eﬀorts of
Aaron Burr). The charter did stipulate, however, that if the company did
not provide a continuous source of “pure and wholesome” water for all cit-
izens desiring it within ten years, it would be dissolved. The other note-
worthy feature of the charter was a carefully hidden section that gave the
company the legal right to use all “surplus” capital for other purposes un-
related to water.
This obscure section of the charter opened the door for Aaron Burr to
pursue banking through the Manhattan Company, which had been his in-
tention from the beginning. Bank charters of the day were diﬃcult to ob-
tain through protracted political processes and were limited in duration;
the Manhattan Company’s charter had crept into existence below the po-
litical radar and was unlimited in duration. Although some other members
of the state legislature apparently knew about the scheme, there was out-
rage when it was publicly discovered. Burr lost his position in a subsequent
election, but the company lived on despite attempts of his political adver-
saries to undermine it.
To maintain its good standing, it was clear that the Manhattan Com-
pany had to provide water to some degree. The real question remained how
adequate it would be. Despite serious concerns about its purity, the com-
pany decided to tap groundwater with the use of wells and pumps. Some
water was ﬂowing as early as 1800. Ironically, Joseph Browne was the lead
engineer of the project. Problems and complaints about irregular and un-
predictable service began almost immediately. The quantity of water pro-
vided was also inadequate for street washing and gutter ﬂushing, forcing
the city to rely on older wells for this purpose. The company provided free
water to the city to ﬁght ﬁres, although its adequacy is unclear.
By 1804, the city council decided that the Manhattan Company’s supply
was inadequate to keep pace with city growth and began revisiting other
proposals to draw water from more distant sources, such as the Bronx
River. The company’s banking business was booming, so its interest in wa-
ter was waning even further. (Incidentally, by this time political and ﬁnan-
cial troubles had forced Aaron Burr to sell most of his stock in the com-
pany, and he had been removed from its board.) DeWitt Clinton, mayor of
New York at the time, proclaimed in 1808 that the company had not ful-
ﬁlled the requirement of its charter (that it provide “pure and wholesome”
water for all citizens desiring it) and thought that, given the diﬃculties and
low proﬁtability of its water operations, it might be willing to sell its wa-
terworks to the city. This would of course require the state legislature to
amend the original charter for it to continue with its banking activities.
Interestingly, DeWitt Clinton was also one of the Manhattan Company
bank’s directors. One of the points upon which negotiations hinged was the
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Many on the city council believed that it operated at a loss, although its
books suggested that it earned an annual return of just under 7 percent on
its original investment.
With this issue unsettled, the city council made an application to the
state legislature to alter the Manhattan Company’s charter and to receive
authority to purchase the waterworks. Amazingly enough, in addition to
serving as mayor and as a bank director, DeWitt Clinton was also a promi-
nent state senator representing a southern district of New York. The legis-
lature acquiesced to these requests. The Manhattan Company was given
the right to lease or sell its waterworks and rights, the length of time it had
to provide “pure and wholesome” water for all citizens desiring it was ex-
tended to twenty years, and its new charter gave it the right to continue
with its banking and other activities even after divesting itself of its water-
works. Additionally, the charter would continue to be perpetual until the
company sold the waterworks, at which point it would last for thirty years
following the sale. The company therefore naturally tried to postpone the
sale as long as possible.
Complaints about the company’s water service were constant. Portions
of the city (the ones with pipe infrastructure) received no water at all for
prolonged periods of time. Repairs were made only to stave oﬀ crises of
public outrage. Water availability to ﬁght ﬁres was so poor that public
funding was used to build cisterns for collecting rainwater to be used to
combat ﬁres. Fires and disease epidemics (despite a poor understanding of
the basis of disease) continued to push the inadequacy of water supply to
the political forefront; public opinion was squarely opposed to the service
provided by the company.
In subsequent years, the alliance between the Manhattan Company and
the city government deteriorated. The city was highly indebted to the bank,
and to meet its obligations it eventually resorted to selling oﬀ its stock in
the company. DeWitt Clinton himself also slowly sold his company stock,
and in 1813 he declined to be reelected as a bank director. By 1820, DeWitt
Clinton was governor of New York, and both he and the state legislature
supported drawing water for New York City from upland rivers. But the
city council continued to be conﬂicted about how to proceed.
In 1823, after several years of surveys and considering its options, the
city council supported another private initiative to charter the New York
and Sharon Canal Company to build a waterway from Sharon, CT, to the
Hudson River to join with a proposed canal to be built from Sharon to
the Housatonic River. The state legislature approved the measure. An-
other private proposal to charter the New York Waterworks Company
also gained momentum, alarming both the Manhattan Company and the
Sharon Canal Companies. Although its charter was eventually approved,
it was believed to be ﬂawed because the Manhattan Company held exclu-
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pany held exclusive rights to surface water in Westchester County. The
Manhattan Company clearly had the most to lose because of its prof-
itable banking activities. Although it was unwilling to invest in drawing
water from distant rivers, it did begin to seek new groundwater supplies
by drilling a new well and began replacing its wooden pipes with iron
ones.
To add to the confusion, a new report claimed that the water supplies of
Rye Pond and the Bronx River, upon which both the New York Water-
works Company and Sharon Canal Company projects depended, was in-
adequate to meet the needs of New York City. After 1830, the water de-
mand in New York had grown so much that serious attention began
shifting from the Bronx River to the Croton River. Previous consideration
of the Croton was limited by the daunting expense required to reach it.
With its eye on mounting a challenge to the Manhattan company, that
year the city council appointed a committee to investigate whether or not
the company had the right to discontinue providing water for ﬁre plugs at
will or any obligation to pay for its damage to streets and sidewalks—and,
more generally, if it had met the conditions of its original charter. The com-
mittee found that water was available to only one-third of the paved and
built city and that its failure to seek more copious sources was inexcus-
able—in short, that it had not met its obligations. An additional blow to
the Manhattan Company was a communication to the city council by a
body of well-known and respected doctors and chemists. It concluded that
all of the groundwater in Manhattan was horribly contaminated with ﬁlth
from graveyards and privies.
By 1833 it was clear that the city was going to build its own waterworks,
and after a considerable amount of debate and conﬂicting geological sur-
veys and engineering reports, the Croton was agreed upon as the most
promising source. The Manhattan Company therefore oﬀered to sell all of
its water rights to the city, leaving the price open to negotiation. After a
devastating ﬁre in 1836, the city opened negotiations with the company to
obtain a temporary supply for ﬁghting ﬁres while the Croton Aqueduct
was under construction. No agreement was ever reached, however. At the
same time, the state legislature found that the company had violated its
charter.
In the end the Manhattan Company’s rights were never purchased be-
cause, with the opening of the Croton Aqueduct in 1842, they were essen-
tially not needed. The company had some legal claim to the groundwater
in Manhattan, but the new source did not draw on Manhattan ground-
water at all. When Croton water began ﬂowing into the city, the company
simply lost its customers. Ironically, it retained its wells for decades after-
wards—not because it was actively providing water from them, but be-
cause it feared future challenges to its charter.
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History and Evidence
In the cases of Boston and New York, city government intervened to
provide water when existing private companies failed to perform well—
which generally meant failure to provide a suﬃcient supply to meet grow-
ing water demand. But Boston and New York were preeminent population
centers in early America that were probably not representative of the typi-
cal American city. Growth in water quantity in the typical city occurred
later and coincided with the sharpest rise in public waterworks ownership.
One city in which this transformation occurred after the turn of the cen-
tury—New Orleans—followed a course similar to that in Boston and New
York (Troesken and Geddes 2003). A private company began providing
New Orleans with water in 1878, but the company refused to extend its
pipes to outlying areas of the city. Moreover, the water it did actually de-
liver was turgid and unﬁltered. The city subsequently petitioned the Loui-
siana legislature to revoke the company’s charter and eventually acquired
the water system in 1908. Shortly afterward the system was expanded
dramatically, and ﬁltration plants were constructed.
Figure 5.1and table 5.1show that public ownership had been increasing
throughout most of the nineteenth century, but that this trend accelerated
from 1890 (when 43 percent of waterworks were publicly owned) through
the 1920s (when 70 percent were publicly owned)—which coincides pre-
cisely with rapid growth in the number and adequacy of water systems. In
particular, the period of fastest public ownership growth (ignoring the ﬁrst
few decades of the nineteenth century, when the absolute number of wa-
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Fig. 5.1 The share of water systems publicly owned in American cities, 
1830 to 1924
Sources:Overlapping series of number of waterworks taken from Galishoﬀ(1980) and Melosi
(2000); authors’ calculations of the share publicly owned. Data are available on the decade
from 1830 to 1890 and for 1896 and 1924; points in between are obtained by linear interpola-
tion.terworks was very small) was the 1890s. Figure 5.2 and table 5.1 show that
the absolute annual increase in number of waterworks accelerated sharply
around 1890. During the 1890–1900 decade, the number of miles of water
mains in major cities with existing water systems also nearly doubled (ﬁg-
ure 5.3).6 This section ﬁrst provides a brief overview of the development of
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Table 5.1 The number of publicly and privately owned waterworks in American
cities, 1830 to 1924
Number of waterworks
Year Total Public Private Percent public
1830 45 — 9 — 36 — 20
1840 65 (2) 23 (1) 42 (1) 35
1850 84 (2) 33 (1) 51 (1) 39
1860 137 (5) 57 (2) 80 (3) 42
1870 244 (11) 116 (6) 128 (5) 48
1880 599 (36) 293 (18) 306 (18) 49
1890 1,879 (128) 806 (51) 1,073 (77) 43
1896 3,180 (217) 1,690 (147) 1,490 (70) 53
1924 9,850 (238) 6,900 (186) 2,950 (52) 70
Sources:Overlapping series of number of waterworks taken from Galishoﬀ(1980) and Melosi
(2000); authors’ calculations of the percent of waterworks publicly owned.
Note: Average annual increase in number of waterworks over the preceding period shown in
parentheses.
Fig. 5.2 Average annual increase in the number of water systems in the United
States, 1830 to 1924
Sources:Overlapping series of number of waterworks taken from Galishoﬀ(1980) and Melosi
(2000); authors’ calculations of average annual increases; data are available on the decade
from 1830 to 1890 and for 1896 and 1924.
6. This is true in major cities for which data are readily available.local public ﬁnance during the nineteenth century and then presents sug-
gestive evidence that it was the emergence of municipal bond markets that
made water system improvements possible.
5.4.1 Local Public Finance during the Nineteenth Century
Although the precise date of the ﬁrst municipal bond issuance in the
United States is unknown, there were very few in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. New York City issued its ﬁrst securities around 1812, and bonds to
support the construction of the Croton Aqueduct were issued in 1837 and
1838. Between 1830 and 1850, municipal indebtedness grew rapidly in both
total and per capita terms (see table 5.2 and ﬁgure 5.4)—but almost exclu-
sively in the largest cities. As table 5.3 shows, at least 93 percent of all city
debt on record in 1843 (the ﬁrst year for which these statistics are available
for all cities) was issued by major population centers (Hillhouse 1936).
The explosive growth of municipal debt in the middle of the century was
probably attributable to restrictions placed on state debt. Following ﬁnan-
cial diﬃculties during the depression of 1837 and a series of state defaults
around 1840, the landscape of local public ﬁnance changed radically.
Many state legislatures amended their constitutions to prohibit state bor-
rowing for costly canals, turnpikes, railroads, and other improvements. As
states were increasingly constrained by pay-as-you-go ﬁnancing, munici-
pal debt arose to ﬁll the gap between what could be aﬀorded and what was
thought to be needed. (Not until after World War I were many state con-
stitutional restrictions on debt oﬃcially relaxed.) A large share of munici-
pal debt during this period was for railroad construction. This era of ex-
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Fig. 5.3 Miles of water mains in selected cities, 1889–92 and 1902
Source: Teaford (1984).pansion peaked in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Between 1868 and 1873,
the net bonded debt of New York tripled; between 1867 and 1873 the
bonded debt of Chicago also tripled. Debt tripled in Boston from 1868 to
1874; Cincinnati’s debt grew by ﬁve times from 1868 to 1876, and Cleve-
land’s debt grew by twelve times from 1867 to 1877 (Griﬃth 1974).
After these years of unchecked borrowing and spending, local econ-
omies turned sour during the panic of 1873. What ensued was the largest
series of municipal bond defaults to that date. (Earlier economic slumps
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Table 5.2 Real municipal debt in American cities, 1843 to 1932
Total municipal debt  Growth over  Per capita municipal  Growth over 
Year (millions of dollars) preceding period debt (dollars) preceding period
1843 625 — 265 —
1853 4,208 0.19 963 0.13
1860 4,055 0.00 652 –0.02
1870 6,629 0.05 669 0.00
1880 13,547 0.07 959 0.04
1890 17,126 0.02 775 –0.02
1902 31,899 0.05 979 0.02
1912 60,310 0.06 1,355 0.03
1922 77,678 0.03 1,357 0.00
1932 186,924 0.09 2,660 0.07
Sources: Nominal debt taken from Hillhouse (1936); historical consumer price index (CPI) taken from
Carter et al. (2005) used to inﬂate debt to 2000 terms; authors’ calculations of growth over the preced-
ing period.
Fig. 5.4 Real per capita municipal debt in the United States, 1843 to 1932
Sources: Nominal debt taken from Hillhouse (1936); historical CPI taken from Carter et al.
(2005) used to inﬂate debt to 2000 terms; historical populations 1840 to 1940 taken from
http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdfhad caused states to default on their obligations, but municipalities gener-
ally did not have much debt during these downturns; see Grinath, Wallis,
and Sylla 1997.) The number of bond issues held void rose from 35 in 1870
to 101 in 1880 (Hillhouse 1936).7 An estimated one-ﬁfth of all municipal
obligations could not be met following this depression; many of these mu-
nicipal defaults during the 1870s were associated with railroads. The panic
of 1873 and its ensuing debt problems were especially severe in southern
cities struggling under Reconstruction. Some renegotiated their debt,
while others gave up their charters or went into receivership (Griﬃth
1974).
Following the panic of 1873 and unprecedented revelations of wide-
spread government corruption, many states and cities introduced new mu-
nicipal debt limitations as a percentage of total property assessments. New
York’s bonded debt peaked in 1876 and fell by a quarter during the next
decade (Teaford 1984). Other cities followed a similar pattern. Strikingly,
Detroit’s net debt fell from $961,000 in 1875 to $12,000 in 1885 (Teaford
1984). In subsequent years, however, these restrictions were circumvented
in several ways. One was the passage of state constitutional amendments
that one historian attributes to the municipal capture of state legislatures
(Teaford 1984). These amendments allowed exceptions for a variety of spe-
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Table 5.3 Debt in selected cities, January 1843
City Total debt (dollars)
New York, NY 295,922,345
Philadelphia, PA 70,915,707















All other cities 45,486,486
Sources: Nominal debt taken from Hillhouse (1936); historical CPI taken from Carter et al.
(2005) used to inﬂate debt to 2000 terms.
7. Data on the total number of bond issues in these years are not readily available.cial ventures including “self-supporting” municipal enterprises like water-
works (Griﬃth 1974). Another was the creation of special districts that
were not technically a part of city government. Many local water authori-
ties were incorporated in this way to be exempt from debt restrictions
(Monkkonen 1995).
The panic of 1893 also contributed to the development of municipal
bond markets and their ability to fund public waterworks. Businesses were
hit the hardest, while municipal governments suﬀered less (Griﬃth 1974).
Consequently, municipal bonds became relatively more attractive to in-
vestors. Interest rates fell, and cities were able to borrow large amounts
to continue ﬁnancing their growth. To quote one ﬁnancial historian, “mu-
nicipalities never enjoyed such a favorable market for their securities, for
by the 1890s no investment was as sound as a municipal bond” (Teaford
1984). The granting of “home rule” to city governments by state legisla-
tures also broadened their ability to borrow and spend. However, very little
of this occurred before the turn of the century (Griﬃth 1974).
5.4.2 Evidence on Local Public Finance and the Supply of Water
One explanation for rapid water system expansion at the end of the
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries is the development
and growing sophistication of local public ﬁnance. Private water compa-
nies could not aﬀord to build systems to serve entire municipal popula-
tions. Only the largest cities could aﬀord adequate water supplies until the
means for substantial borrowing were developed. Waterworks were exor-
bitantly expensive, even in comparison with other municipal utilities. In
1915, the mean value of municipal waterworks exceeded annual city gov-
ernment revenue, as shown in table 5.4. Mindful of the fact that many wa-
ter systems were built long before 1915, the expenses of constructing a wa-
ter system relative to annual municipal receipts were undoubtedly larger
than shown here. Available statistics suggest that in 1905, waterworks
were the largest debt line item of municipal government (U.S. Bureau of
the Census 1907a).
Several diﬀerent strands of evidence support this view. The timing of
municipal investments in water provision by city size provides a ﬁrst piece
of evidence. Figure 5.5 shows municipal ownership over time by city size
among all cities with publicly owned water systems in 1915. In general,
large cities municipalized their waterworks earlier than smaller ones. For
example, all of these cities with over 500,000 people in 1915 had a public
water system by the end of the 1850s, while the share of smaller cities with
public water systems at that time was below 20 percent.8
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8. It is possible that city size responded to public investments in water, but readily available
statistics do not allow for the bidirectionality of this relationship to be disentangled. See sub-
sequent paragraphs for further discussion.Table 5.4 Reported book value of water systems and annual revenue in selected American
cities, 1915
Value of water  Total municipal  Value-revenue 
system (dollars) revenue (dollars) ratio
All cities over 500,000 population 569,727,688 462,077,044 1.23
New York, NY 350,004,152 206,010,937 1.70
Chicago, IL 52,557,484 80,622,887 0.65
Philadelphia, PA 30,000,000 45,242,379 0.66
All cities 300,000 to 500,000 population 149,222,136 146,467,942 1.02
Buﬀalo, NY 15,702,219 15,184,834 1.03
Los Angeles, CA 36,058,144 24,405,199 1.48
Cincinnati, OH 17,366,561 13,785,166 1.26
All cities 100,000 to 300,000 population 186,574,699 171,787,677 1.09
Jersey City, NJ 12,448,453 6,792,713 1.83
Kansas City, MO 8,967,124 10,296,283 0.87
Rochester, NY 9,768,056 7,408,794 1.32
All cities 50,000 to 100,000 population 93,665,860 89,950,262 1.04
Ft. Worth, TX 3,937,893 1,694,390 2.32
Somerville, MA 1,017,365 1,916,006 0.53
Harrisburg, PA 2,487,150 1,481,848 1.68
Sources:Reported book value of water systems taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1907a); total mu-
nicipal revenue taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975); gross national product (GNP) deﬂator
taken from Balke and Gordon (1989) used to inﬂate water system book values to 1915 terms; authors’
calculations of value-revenue ratios.
Fig. 5.5 Share of cities with publicly owned water systems by population and
decade among cities with publicly owned systems in 1915
Source: U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1899).
If the municipal ﬁnance explanation was correct, one would also expect
to see rapid growth in debt and revenue among small cities relative to large
cities at the end of the nineteenth century (when ﬁgure 5.5 suggests that
public ownership was rising faster among the smaller cities). Figure 5.6
shows that this is exactly what occurred. In the period from 1880 to 1902,
174 David Cutler and Grant Millerdebt in small cities grew by about one-third while debt in the largest cities
fell by more than 10 percent.9
Of course this growth in municipal debt could have been due to either
supply or demand factors. Our supply-side explanation is that ﬁnancial in-
novation and investor interest made it possible for smaller cities to borrow
much more at this time than earlier. Alternatively, it may have been that
cities suddenly decided that they needed to borrow more and thus de-
manded additional debt. Although not readily available by city size, mu-
nicipal bond yields during the late nineteenth century provide some means
of distinguishing between supply and demand explanations for growth in
municipal debt. The supply explanation implies that yields should have
fallen with the increase in borrowing, while the demand explanation im-
plies that yields should have increased.
Figure 5.7 shows mean nominal and real municipal bond yields in New
England from 1857 to 1913.10In general, real bond yield ﬂuctuations coin-
cided with the business cycle. Real yields rose and then fell dramatically
following the panic of 1873 and did not return to this level by the end of the
century. Although there was a smaller increase in the middle of the 1890s,
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Fig. 5.6 Percent change in real per capita debt in American cities, 1880–1902, 
by municipal population in 1902
Sources: Nominal debt taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1907b); GNP deﬂator taken
from Balke and Gordon (1989) used to inﬂate debt to 1902 terms; authors’ calculations of per-
cent changes.
9. The cities used to construct ﬁgure 5.6 were selected as follows. First, states with major
population centers were chosen: California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin.
All cities with a population of 15,000 or more in 1900 and with debt statistics in 1880, 1890,
and 1902 were then chosen within these states.
10. Nominal municipal bond yields shown in ﬁgure 5.7 are taken from Macaulay (1938)
and can also be found in NBER’s Macro History Data Series #13020. Real bond yields were
calculated using the implicit GNP deﬂator provided in Balke and Gordon (1989).this is presumably related to the panic of 1893. With the exception of busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations, real yields were low during the late 1890s and early
twentieth century as municipal borrowing increased and municipal
involvement in water accelerated. Lower yields during this period are gen-
erally consistent with a supply-side explanation that emphasizes the devel-
opment of municipal bond markets. Evidence on alternative demand-
oriented explanations is examined in the next section, but these factors
should be reﬂected in the time series of municipal bond yields as well. The
absence of high and rising real yields during this period of growing debt
and increasing public involvement in water does not support them.
The decline in municipal ownership of water systems in the 1880s also
lends some support to the municipal ﬁnance view. In the wake of the de-
pression of 1873, the corruption scandals exposed at roughly the same
time, and the subsequent rise in municipal bond issues held void, borrow-
ing declined in all cities (shown in ﬁgure 5.6 for 1880 to 1890) as states
imposed tight restrictions on municipal indebtedness. Although these
indebtedness restrictions were only temporary obstacles, they were
accompanied by the only decline in public waterworks ownership during
the entire nineteenth century (see the decline from 1880 to 1890 shown in
ﬁgure 5.1).
5.5 Alternative Explanations: Changes in Value (or Perceived Value)
One set of alternative explanations for the rapid expansion of water sys-
tems and increase in municipal ownership is that the value (or perceived
value) of water systems increased. This would have increased demand for
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Fig. 5.7 Nominal and real mean annual municipal bond yields in all New England
cities, 1870–1913
Sources: Nominal bond yields taken from NBER’s Macro History Data Series #13020; GNP
deﬂator taken from Balke and Gordon (1989).water services, and particularly in the presence of positive externalities, lo-
cal governments may have been the appropriate providers of water.
5.5.1 Externalities and New Knowledge about Disease
There are clearly large external beneﬁts of water supplies not captured
by private water companies. The most obvious ones are disease reduction
and improved capabilities of combating ﬁres (a less clear one is that water
systems were an economic stimulus through other pathways). On the sur-
face, it is unclear why the existence of externalities would explain a sharp
rise in municipal waterworks ownership beginning around 1890. Fires and
epidemic infectious diseases had been serious problems in cities for as long
as cities have existed. It is possible, however, that the bacteriological revo-
lution of the 1870s and 1880s may have provided a new impetus for con-
cerns about disease externalities. As knowledge of the basis of waterborne
diseases became clearer, concerns about the socially ineﬃcient incentives
of private companies may have intensiﬁed.
But there are several reasons that call this line of reasoning into ques-
tion. One is that dirty water was believed to be causally linked to disease
long before the bacteriological revolution. The ﬁrst demonstration of the
link between unclean water and disease was John Snow’s famous demon-
stration of how cholera spread from a single water pump in London in the
1850s. Snow had premonitions of the germ theory, but it took several more
decades for the theory to be fully articulated.
The prevailing theory at the time, the miasma theory of disease, held that
a variety of illnesses are the result of poisonous, malevolent vapors (“mi-
asmas”) that are oﬀensive to the smell (Anderson 1984; Duﬀy 1990). The
widespread acceptance of the miasma theory might have been based on
Pavlovian learning. People exposed to foul odors were more likely to get
sick, foul-smelling areas tended to have more sick people, and more people
seemed to get sick during the summer seasons, during which oﬀensive
odors were more common. The leap of logic from correlation to causation
led to misdirected sanitary interventions—and some successful ones as
well.
The externality argument is also generally diﬃcult to reconcile with the
empirical observation that private water companies were more likely to
possess expensive water ﬁltration plants than were publicly owned com-
panies early in the twentieth century (Troesken and Geddes 2003). And
private water companies were ostensibly legally liable for damages attrib-
utable to large waterborne disease outbreaks (Troesken and Geddes), al-
though it is not clear how enforceable this liability was in practice.
5.5.2 Population Density
As large numbers of Americans migrated to urban areas from the coun-
tryside, the population density of cities may have increased. Urban slums
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the population density of cities grew rapidly, deteriorating public health
conditions may have increased the demand for water. Similarly, the posi-
tive externalities of municipal water systems may have grown, giving local
governments stronger reasons for getting involved.
Although reliable statistics on municipal population density before the
1890s are generally not available, there appears to have been no abrupt in-
crease that coincided with water system growth. Data from a consistent
panel of 119 cities from 1890 to 1950 suggest that the only large increase in
municipal population density occurred between 1910 and 1920 (Kim
2002)—twenty to thirty years after major waterworks improvements began.
5.6 Alternative Explanations: Changes in Costs
In addition to changes in their value, another set of potential explana-
tions for rapid water system growth and municipal ownership is that costs
fell. The following section explores these possibilities.
5.6.1 Natural Monopoly
The cost structure of public utility provision is generally characterized
by declining marginal costs. Hence, one ﬁrm could in principle serve an en-
tire market most eﬃciently. Monopoly power held by a proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrm of course commonly leads to ineﬃcient service provision. As will all
monopolists, a monopoly water supplier will raise prices to the proﬁt-
maximizing level and will restrict quantity to support those prices. Public
ownership may be the natural response in the view of local governments.
However, a natural monopoly explanation fails to account for either the
timing of the increase in municipal waterworks ownership or for why wa-
terworks were increasingly city owned while gas and electrical utilities were
not. On the timing, it is not clear why either welfare losses or local govern-
ment losses should have suddenly accelerated around 1890, producing the
observed increase in municipal waterworks ownership. Additionally, the
cost structures of gas and electricity provision were similar, but these util-
ities were rarely privatized. Table 5.5 shows that gas companies were al-
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Table 5.5 Public ownership of gas companies, 1890 to 1920
Year No. of companies No. publicly owned % publicly owned
1890 871 8 0.9
1900 896 15 1.7
1910 1282 122 9.5
1920 1008 45 4.5
Source: Troesken (1997).most exclusively private from 1890 to 1920 when public waterworks own-
ership was rising most rapidly. Fewer statistics for electric companies are
available, but around the turn of the century, nearly 70 percent of the 952
electric companies in the United States were privately owned (U.S. Com-
missioner of Labor 1899).
5.6.2 Contracting Failures
Although some dimensions of water provision can easily be observed
and monitored, or stipulated ex ante in a contract (e.g., water pressure,
rates, etc.), many others cannot. For example, it is diﬃcult to specify in ad-
vance that certain new population centers not yet in existence should be
served or what new water sources should be tapped to meet future demand
growth. As the provision of water became increasingly complex and regu-
latory requirements became more onerous, contracting costs may have re-
duced the proﬁtability of the water business, making it less attractive to
private ﬁrms.
There are some suggestive ﬁndings that litigation against private water
companies was positively related to municipal takeover during the pe-
riod of rapid waterworks municipalization (Troesken and Geddes 2003).
It is unclear why contract incompleteness would have become more prob-
lematic at the end of the nineteenth century, but there is some histori-
cal suggestion that contracts became more elaborate—and potentially
more costly—shortly before 1900. For example, the National Municipal
League’s model Municipal Corporation Act was drafted in 1899 and sub-
sequently adopted by many cities (Webber and Wildavsky 1986). However,
a contracting cost explanation does not square with the continuation of
predominantly private ownership in gas and electricity.
Holdup is another potential contracting diﬃculty. City governments
may have had diﬃculty credibly committing not to expropriate the enor-
mous infrastructure investments made by private water companies. Fol-
lowing the bacteriological revolution as technological innovations to com-
bat waterborne disease were developed (such as ﬁltration), the investments
required to build and operate water systems increased substantially. Hence
losses (or fears of losses) due to municipal expropriation could have po-
tentially grown near at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twen-
tieth centuries.
There is some evidence that municipal takeovers of private water systems
were positively related to the extensiveness of a water system and nega-
tively related to ﬁnancial diﬃculties of private water companies (Troesken
and Geddes 2003). One interpretation of this correlation is that cities were
more likely to seize private waterworks that promised greater rents. Fear of
expropriation could have also induced private companies to rationally un-
derinvest in their water systems, resulting in inadequate service provision
and an additional rationale for municipal ownership.
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more likely than public ones to own expensive ﬁltration facilities. Accord-
ing to an 1899 federal government survey of water companies, 19 percent
of the private companies had ﬁlters while only 6 percent of the public ones
did (Troesken 1999). It is also unclear why municipal seizures or fear of ex-
propriation would have risen in the 1890s and early twentieth century if it
was truly a period in which corruption in municipal government was actu-
ally falling while contracts were growing more sophisticated. Moreover,
the absence of municipal takeovers of other public utilities (gas and elec-
tricity) during this period also seems to contradict this view.
Finally, a recent analysis cites a positive cross-sectional correlation be-
tween population density and public ownership as evidence that contract
evasion and appropriation problems were responsible for municipal con-
trol (Masten 2004). However, this would also be consistent with larger
cities’ (which were typically denser) having greater ﬁnancial means to build
or expand municipal water systems.
5.6.3 Corruption Costs and Administrative Reform
Administrative reform that began at the very end of the nineteenth cen-
tury may have reduced the corruption costs associated with municipal
ownership of waterworks. As a number of city government scandals were
exposed in the 1870s, cities began experimenting with administrative re-
forms that aimed to reduce corruption. These reforms appear to have been
at least partially responsible for the creation of standing boards to perform
specialized functions like operating water systems. Board members were
surely corruptible, but probably less so than city council members (who
operated municipal water systems before professional boards emerged). It
is not clear if delegation of authority to city boards was actually purpose-
ful (to reduce corruption) or coincidental (driven by the increasingly tech-
nical and complex nature of city functions).
The problem with a corruption costs and administrative reform expla-
nation is that the sharpest rise in public waterworks ownership occurred
in the 1890s. Much of the eﬀective administrative reforms came in the
early decades of the twentieth century at the dawn of the Progressive Era.
This was a primary objective of the National Municipal League’s model
Municipal Corporation Act that was ﬁrst drafted in 1899 (Webber and
Wildavsky 1986). Although corruption was surely present in historical
water supply and management (McCarthy 1987), it seems to have rela-
tively little direct bearing on public ownership or the expansion of water
systems.
5.6.4 Growth in the Supply of Municipal Engineers
A ﬁnal possibility is that exogenous growth in the supply of municipal
engineers made it possible for cities to operate water systems on their own.
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self-interest or public interest), but they simply lacked the human resources
to do so.
The primary piece of evidence against this explanation is the fact that the
public sector was in large part responsible for engineering and applied sci-
ence training in the late nineteenth century. This means that increases in
the number of engineers were probably not exogenous with respect to ma-
jor public works projects.11 The Morrill Land Grant Act provided large
tracts of federal land to states to endow and support institutions of higher
education specializing in agriculture and mechanical arts (Goldin and
Katz 1999). During the 1870s and 1880s, the largest numbers of new engi-
neering programs were established at land grant institutions (Edelstein
2002).
Historical data on the output of new engineers in the United States by
area of specialization are not readily available. Data on the output of civil
engineers in New York State (shown in table 5.6) suggest that the largest
surge in the production of engineers occurred after the turn of the twenti-
eth century. If the training of engineers in New York over time is represen-
tative of the national trend, growth in the supply of engineers does not hold
much promise for explaining the rapid expansion and increasing public
ownership of waterworks.12
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11. An exogenous increase in the supply of engineers that accelerated the construction of
waterworks would also be reﬂected in rising municipal bond yields as cities demanded addi-
tional debt. Figure 5.7 shows no clear evidence of this.
12. New York State most likely led many of the other states.
Table 5.6 Civil engineering degrees awarded in New York State by decade, 1830
to 1949
No. of civil engineering  Absolute change from 













Sources: Number of awarded civil engineering degrees taken from Edelstein (2002); authors’
calculations of change over previous decade.
Note: We believe the numbers provided represent both ﬁrst and advanced degrees.5.7 Conclusion
The quantity of piped water supplied in American cities grew dramati-
cally near the turn of the twentieth century, and local government owner-
ship seems to have been a driving force behind this surge in water system
construction and expansion. Governments may have wanted to be in-
volved earlier—and in fact were in the largest cities—but ﬁnancial con-
straints appear to have prevented them from doing so. As innovation in
local public ﬁnance made it easier for smaller cities to borrow, many
American cities did in fact purchase or build waterworks. Even larger cities
that already owned water systems were able to ﬁnance massive expansions
to previously unserved neighborhoods. In an era of rampant corruption in
local government (Steﬀens 1957), it is striking that government involve-
ment in such a costly sector as water seems to have advanced the public in-
terest considerably (if not the private interests of politicians as well). This
observation is consistent with those of others that corruption—although
undesirable and ineﬃcient—can in fact go hand in hand with policies that
improve public welfare if corrupt politicians seek both political support
and a robust economy to exploit (Menes 2003).
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